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Abstract
We consider the problem of differentially private query release through a synthetic database approach.
Departing from the existing approaches that require the query set to be specified in advance, we advocate
to devise query-set independent mechanisms, with an ambitious goal of providing accurate answers, while
meeting the privacy constraints, for all queries in a general query class. Specifically, a differentially
private mechanism is constructed to “encode” rich stochastic structure into the synthetic database, and
“customized” companion estimators are then derived to provide accurate answers by making use of all
available information, including the mechanism (which is public information) and the query functions.
Accordingly, the distortion under the best of this kind of mechanisms at the worst-case query in a general
query class, so called the minimax distortion, provides a fundamental characterization of differentially
private query release.
For the general class of statistical queries, we prove that with the squared-error distortion measure,
the minimax distortion is O(1/n) by deriving asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds in the regime
that the database size n goes to infinity. The upper bound is achievable by a mechanism E and its
corresponding companion estimators, which points directly to the feasibility of the proposed approach in
large databases. We further evaluate the mechanism E and the companion estimators through experiments
on real datasets from Netflix and Facebook. Experimental results show improvement over the state-of-art
MWEM algorithm and verify the scaling behavior O(1/n) of the minimax distortion.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is envisaged that in the forthcoming “big data” era, there will be an abundance of rich data about
individuals in many domains, such as healthcare, mobile networks, social networks and web search.
While data analysis uncovers scientific and societal insights, it also poses potential “threats” to personal
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2privacy. It is therefore of great interest to establish a systematic understanding of privacy-preserving data
analysis, aiming to provide utility for data analytics while preserving privacy. To rigorously quantify
privacy, the celebrated notion of differential privacy, introduced in a line of work [1]–[3], has emerged
as an analytical foundation for privacy-preserving data analysis.
Viewing a database as a vector of rows, with each row corresponding to some sensitive record of
an individual (e.g., a patient’s medical record), an information releasing mechanism is said to be -
differentially private if the change of a single row alters the probability of any output instance by at
most an e multiplicative factor. By this requirement, the presence of an individual, or the content of the
record associated with an individual, cannot be exactly deduced from the released information. Therefore,
a differentially private mechanism guarantees that only limited additional information about an individual
would be leaked.
As is standard, information about a database is acquired through queries. Therefore, a central problem
in differential privacy is to privately release outputs that permit accurate answers to be derived for as
many as possible queries. This problem has been extensively studied in the differential privacy literature,
and many mechanisms for query release have been developed (see, e.g., [1], [4]–[11]). Adopted by much
of the existing work, a natural approach is to non-interactively generate a synthetic database, which is a
one-shot “sanitization” of the original database consisting of rows that come from the same data universe
as the rows of the original database.
In contrast to the interactive counterpart, the non-interactive synthetic database approach allows ar-
bitrary number of queries to be answered without compromising differential privacy. More specifically,
queries arrive online in the interactive approach and each query consumes some privacy budget. Therefore,
a privacy allocation plan is needed and only a finite number of queries can be answered before the privacy
is breached. While in the non-interactive approach, the privacy budget is used all at once for the synthetic
database generation, since further processing of the released synthetic database does not consume any
privacy budget. As long as the synthetic database is released through a differentially private mechanism,
arbitrary number of queries can be answered without compromising differential privacy.
However, although the synthetic database approach allows arbitrary number of queries to be answered
without compromising differential privacy, most existing mechanisms for synthetic database release are
still confined to a specific query set. Typically, the existing mechanisms [4], [5], [9]–[11] require the
query set to be specified beforehand, and the accuracy guarantee becomes worse as the size of the query
set increases. There are at least two drawbacks in this approach. First, to specify a query set beforehand,
a priori knowledge of the queries of interest is needed, and the queries cannot be chosen adaptively.
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Fig. 1: Road map of our approach for differentially private query release.
Second, to achieve certain accuracy, the size of the query set must be smaller than a threshold. However,
as pointed out in [12], in many research settings, it is hard to decide in advance exactly which statistics
should be computed. As a consequence, the synthetic database approach would not work well for such
scenarios. These drawbacks debilitate the promise that arbitrary number of queries can be answered
privately in a non-interactive approach, giving rise to the following question: is it possible to make the
synthetic database releasing mechanism independent of any specific query set while still enabling accurate
answers to be derived for all queries in a general query class from the released synthetic database? If
this could be done, the synthetic database approach would be literally “non-interactive,” in the sense that
users do not need to interact with the curator during the entire process, whereas users need to submit the
query set to the curator beforehand in the existing mechanisms.
In this paper, we give positive answers to the above question for a general class of queries, via taking
the following approach. First, a synthetic database is released by a query-set independent differentially
private mechanism, aiming at providing accurate answers for all queries in the query class. Then each
query is answered by an estimator based on the released synthetic database, rather than directly carried
out as if the synthetic database were the actual database. In particular, the mechanism is constructed to
“encode” rich stochastic structure into the synthetic database, and the estimator makes use of the structure
of the mechanism (which is public information) and the query function. This approach decouples synthetic
database generating and query answering. By introducing the flexibility of “customizing” estimators for
different queries, it opens the possibility of deriving accurate answers for all queries in a general query
class from the same released synthetic database. We use synthetic database release to refer to the process
of generating an output synthetic database, and query release to refer to the entire process including
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4releasing a synthetic database and deriving answers to queries using estimators.
Based on this approach, we advocate a minimax distortion view of differentially private query release.
Consider a database consisting of n rows/entries, each of which takes values from a domain D = {0, 1}l,
i.e., they have l binary attributes. The database is then represented by a vector x ∈ Dn. Consider an
-differentially private mechanism M for synthetic database release and let Y = M(x) denote the
output. For each query q : Dn → R in a query class Q, where R is some abstract space, an estimator
qˆ : Dn → R is used to answer the query based on the synthetic database, and the answer is denoted
by qˆ(Y ), as illustrated in Figure 1. The accuracy of M for a query q ∈ Q is evaluated when an
optimal estimator qˆ∗ is in use, since an optimal estimator fully exploits the available information in the
mechanism. To guarantee accuracy for all queries in the query class, the performance of M is measured
by the worst-case distortion among queries in Q. Then a fundamental characterization of differentially
private query release is the following minimax distortion:
D = inf
-differentially
private mechanisms
sup
q∈Q,x∈Dn
E[ρ(qˆ∗(Y ), q(x))], (1)
where ρ is a distortion measure, qˆ∗ is the optimal estimator, and Y follows the probability distribution
induced by x through the mechanism. This minimax distortion characterizes the best one can get from an -
differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanism for the worst-case query accuracy guarantee,
yielding a minimax distortion view of differentially private query release. Our main contributions are
summarized as follows.
Contributions
1) We propose a two-phase approach for differentially private query release: First, a synthetic database
is released by a query-set independent differentially private mechanism, aiming at providing accurate
answers for all queries in a general query class; Then queries are answered by customized estimators.
Based on this approach, we advocate a minimax distortion view of differentially private query release,
where the minimax distortion D is defined to be the distortion under the best -differentially private
synthetic database releasing mechanism for the worst-case query in a general query class. Accordingly,
the best mechanism allows all queries in a general query class to be answered with a distortion upper
bounded by the minimax distortion.
2) For the class of statistical queries (which is a generalization of the class of linear queries in
the literature), we consider the minimax distortion DS with the squared-error distortion measure, i.e.,
ρ(s, t) = (s − t)2 for any s, t ∈ R. We prove that the minimax distortion DS is O(1/n) by deriving
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5asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds in the regime that the database size n goes to infinity, for
given data universe dimension l and privacy level .
The upper bound on DS is achieved by a differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanism
E and the companion estimators. The mechanism E can be viewed as an instance of the exponential
mechanism and the randomized response mechanism. It encodes an independence structure into the
released synthetic database that is exploited by the companion estimators. Under E and the estimators,
all the statistical queries can be answered with distortion O(1/n), which guarantees reasonable accuracy
in large databases. In conclusion, there exists a query-set independent differentially private synthetic
database releasing mechanism that permits accurate answers to be derived for all the statistical queries
from the released synthetic database.
3) We evaluate the mechanism E and the companion estimators through a number of experiments.
The experimental results on a Netflix dataset for statistical queries show that this approach provides
reasonable accuracy for all the tested queries, irrespective of the form of the queries or the number of the
tested queries, which improves over the MWEM algorithm. The scaling behavior O(1/n) of the minimax
distortion is also verified by the results. The experiment on a Facebook dataset shows that this approach
works well for the application of differentially private cut function release for graphs.
Related Work
Differential privacy, introduced in the seminal work [1], [2], has attracted much attention and has
emerged as an analytical foundation for privacy-preserving data analysis. Extensive research has been
done for both interactive and non-interactive approaches.
Non-interactive approaches have been preferred by data-mining and statistics community. However,
some negative results have been found about this approach. Dinur and Nissim [13] showed that noise
of magnitude o(
√
n) is blatantly non-private against n log2 n random queries, where the queries may
involve only a subset of the rows. Dwork et al. [1] considered the statistical difference between two
distributions that are induced by two databases that have very different answers to the same query. They
showed that for many queries, this statistical difference is small unless the database size is exponential
in the dimension of the data universe.
These negative results motivate interactive approaches, where the number of queries was initially limited
to a sublinear order of n. Dwork et al. [1] proposed the Laplace mechanism that adds Laplace noise
to the real answer of a low sensitivity query. When independent noise is added to different queries, the
distortion of each query scaled as O(|Q|/n). Subsequent work [6], [8] focused on predicate/linear queries
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6and developed mechanisms that allow exponential number of queries to be answered with distortion
O(polylog(|Q|)/n1/3) and O((log(|Q|))1/2/n1/2), respectively, where the latter is for (, δ)-differential
privacy.
Non-interactive approach was revisited by Blum, Ligett and Roth [4]. The mechanism proposed in this
work guarantees that the distortion for each predicate query in a concept class Q is upper bounded by
O((VCDIM(Q))1/3/n1/3), where VCDIM(Q) is the VC-dimension of Q. A similar distortion bound
O((log(|Q|))1/3/n1/3) was achieved by the work of Hardt, Ligett and McSherry [9] for linear queries. A
distortion bound O((log(|Q|))1/2/n1/2) under (, δ)-differential privacy was also achieved in this work.
In this paper, we consider a more general class of queries, named statistical queries, and aim at providing
accurate answers for all queries in this query class. If the absolute-error distortion ρ = |s − t| for any
s, t ∈ R is used, as the above related work, then the synthetic database releasing mechanism E and
the proposed companion estimators give answers to all the statistical queries with expected distortion
O(1/n1/2).
Minimax risk is a classical framework in statistics [14] that focuses on estimating parameters of
the underlying distribution. Minimax rates were studied under local privacy, which is a privacy notion
different from differential privacy, by Duchi, Jordan and Wainwright [15], [16]. In contrast, this study
does not assume any knowledge of the underlying distribution of the database, and focuses on providing
accurate answers to a general class of queries.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the model used in this paper.
In Section III, we present our minimax distortion view of the differentially private query release. The
class of statistical queries is studied in Section IV, and some generalizations are given in Section V.
Experimental evaluation of the proposed approach and the application of cut function release for graphs
are presented in Section VI. Finally, we conclude our work and discuss future work in Section VII.
Notation: Throughout this paper we use the following basic notation. Denote the set of real numbers
by R, the set of nonnegative real numbers by R+. Let R+ = R+∪{+∞}. Denote the set of nonnegative
integers by N and denote [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} for n ∈ N \ {0}.
II. MODEL
We consider the following model for a database. A database is represented by a vector x of length n,
with each entry corresponding to a row of the database and n being the size of the database. Entries of x
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7are denoted by x1, x2, . . . , xn, and they take values from a domain D = {0, 1}l, i.e., they have l binary
attributes. Then Dn = ({0, 1}l)n denotes the set of all possible databases. Two databases x, x′ ∈ Dn are
said to be neighbors if they differ on exactly one row, and x ∼ x′ denotes the neighboring relation.
Information about a database is acquired through queries. A query is a function q : Dn → R, where R
is some abstract range. Consider a database x ∈ Dn. The answer q(x) to the query contains information
about x; however, directly releasing q(x) may compromise privacy, necessitating privacy-preserving
information releasing mechanisms.
Definition 1. A mechanism M is specified by an associated mapping µM : Dn → P , where P is the
set of probability measures on some measurable space (S,F), called the range of the mechanism M.
Taking a database x ∈ Dn as the input, the mechanism M outputs an S-valued random variable with
distribution measure µM(x) on (S,F).
Definition 2. (Dwork et al. [1], [2]) A mechanism M is -differentially private for some  ∈ R+ if for
any pair of neighboring databases x, x′ ∈ Dn, and any measurable K ∈ F ,
P{M(x) ∈ K} ≤ eP{M(x′) ∈ K}. (2)
Intuitively, differential privacy requires certain indistinguishability between the distributions induced
by neighboring databases. The smaller  is, the more indistinguishability is required, and hence the better
privacy is. We call the parameter  the level of differential privacy. Note that the differential privacy
property of a mechanism is fully characterized by its associated mapping.
We consider differentially private mechanisms for non-interactive synthetic database release. Specifi-
cally, let ℘(Dn) denote the power set of Dn. Then we consider differentially private mechanisms with
range (Dn, ℘(Dn)). LetM be such a mechanism and x ∈ Dn be a database. Then the output Y =M(x)
is a Dn-valued random variable that represents the released synthetic database. Many mechanisms for
synthetic database release have been developed (see, e.g., [4], [5], [9]–[11]), where a query q is typically
answered by q(Y ), i.e., a query is answered as if the synthetic database were the actual database. These
mechanisms require the query set to be specified in advance and the accuracy guarantee depends on the
size of the query set.
In this paper, we explore the following approach. First, a synthetic database is released using a query-set
independent differentially private mechanism, and then queries are answered by customized estimators.
For each query q in a query class Q, an estimator qˆ : Dn → R is used to answer the query based on
the synthetic database, and thus the answer is denoted by qˆ(Y ). To achieve good accuracy, the estimator
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8qˆ should be designed according to the mechanism M and the query q, making use of all the available
information. The distortion between the actual answer q(x) and the released answer qˆ(Y ) is measured
by a distortion measure ρ on the range of the query q. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1, where
the mechanism is represented by the probability distribution p(· | x) of Y for each input database x, and
qˆ has p(· | x) and q as inputs to indicate the design dependence.
Note that in this non-interactive approach, as long as the mechanism M is -differentially private, the
whole query release process is -differentially private, i.e., arbitrary number of queries can be answered
and any estimator can be used, with the level of differential privacy still preserved.
III. MINIMAX DISTORTION
The proposed approach aims at privately releasing a synthetic database that permits accurate answers
to be derived for all queries in a query class. Therefore, a natural fundamental characterization of
differentially private query release is the following minimax distortion: the distortion under the best
differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanism (the “min” part) for the worst-case query
in the query class (the “max” part).
For each query q : Dn → R, let ρ : R × R → R+ be a distortion measure on the space R. For the
sake of fair comparison, we assume that q is normalized, i.e.,
max
x,x′∈Dn
ρ(q(x), q(x′)) = 1, (3)
which rules out trivial queries that map all possible databases to a constant. For each query q, to guarantee
that the released answers have “physical meanings,” we consider the estimators such that the answers
released by them correspond to possible answers to the query q on real databases, i.e., the estimators in
Qˆq = {qˆ → R | qˆ(Dn) ⊆ q(Dn)}, which we call proper estimators. Consider an -differentially private
mechanism M and an estimator qˆ ∈ Qˆq for the query q, the distortion of the answer is defined by the
following worst-case distortion among all possible databases:
sup
x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)[ρ(qˆ(Y ), q(x))], (4)
where the subscript Y ∼ µM(x) indicates that Y follows the distribution µM(x), and the expectation is
taken over all the randomness.
To minimize distortion, an estimator should be designed according to the mechanismM and the query
q, making use of all the available information. Therefore an optimal estimator qˆ∗ is given by
qˆ∗ ∈ arg inf
qˆ∈Qˆq
sup
x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)[ρ(qˆ(Y ), q(x))]. (5)
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Dn to q(Dn), which are both finite sets, indicating that the infimum in (5) can be attained. Since the
information in a mechanism is fully exploited only when an optimal estimator is in use, the accuracy of
an -differentially private mechanism M for a query q is evaluated with an optimal estimator qˆ∗, i.e., by
the distortion
sup
x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)[ρ(qˆ
∗(Y ), q(x))]. (6)
The synthetic database released byM is expected to answer all queries in a query class Q. To guarantee
accuracy for all queries in Q, the performance of M is measured by the worst-case distortion among all
queries in Q, i.e., by
sup
q∈Q
{
sup
x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)[ρ(qˆ
∗(Y ), q(x))]
}
. (7)
Let U be the set of mappings associated with -differentially private mechanisms. Then we define the
minimax distortion as
D = inf
µM∈U
sup
q∈Q
{
sup
x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)[ρ(qˆ
∗(Y ), q(x))]
}
. (8)
The minimax distortion is a fundamental characterization of -differentially private query release since it
characterizes the best one can get from an -differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanism
for the worst-case query accuracy guarantee. In what follows we will study differentially private query
release from this minimax distortion view, and derive upper and lower bounds on the minimax distortion
accordingly.
IV. STATISTICAL QUERIES
In this section, we consider differentially private query release for the class of statistical queries, which
is a much larger class than the class of linear queries in the literature.
Definition 3. A statistical query qϕ : Dn → R is specified by a sequence of functions
ϕ = (ϕi : D → R, i = 1, 2, . . . ), (9)
where each ϕi is a function of the ith row of the database, which we call a row function, and there is no
constraint on its form except boundedness. Let ai = minv∈D ϕi(v), bi = maxv∈D ϕi(v) and ci = bi−ai.
Assume that for any i ∈ [n], a ≤ ai < bi ≤ b and ci ≥ c for some a, b, c ∈ R with c > 0. Then qϕ is
defined by
qϕ(x) =
1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
ϕi(xi), (10)
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where x1, . . . , xn are the rows of the database x.
Note that the above definition of statistical query is a generalization of the so called linear query (and
its special form predicate/counting query) in the literature [4], [6], [8]–[10], [17]–[19], since a linear
query can be written as a statistical query with identical row functions for all the rows. Linear queries
can be answered as long as the histogram of a database is known. However, histograms are often not
sufficient for answering statistical queries, making the approaches that privately release histograms not
applicable for statistical queries.
Denote the class of statistical queries by QS and let ρ : R× R→ R+ be the squared-error distortion,
i.e., ρ(s, t) = (s− t)2 for any s, t ∈ R. Then the minimax distortion for statistical queries can be written
as
DS = inf
µM∈U
sup
qϕ∈QS,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗ϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2]. (11)
Theorem 1. The minimax distortion for statistical queries satisfies the following bounds:(
1− Φ(1))2
2l+4
(
1 + e

2l−1
)3 1n + o
(
1
n
)
≤ DS ≤
4(b− a)2(1 + (2l − 1)e−)2
c2(1− e−)2
1
n
, (12)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard Gaussian distribution, and a, b, c
are the constants in Definition 3.
The upper bound in this theorem is given by the performance of an -differentially private synthetic
database releasing mechanism E and the companion estimators, which are presented in Section IV-A.
The lower bound in this theorem is derived by bounding the average distortion. The minimax distortion
is defined for the worst-case distortion over statistical queries and databases. We consider a stochastic
model for the queries and the database. Then the average distortion under this model serves as a lower
bound on the worst-case distortion. Analyzing the average distortion under the constraint of -differential
privacy as in Section IV-B gives the lower bound.
Consider the asymptotic regime that the database size n goes to infinity for given data universe
dimension l and privacy level . Then the upper bound indicates that there exist query-set independent
differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanisms and estimators such that all the statistical
queries can be answered with distortion O(1/n). Further, the lower bound and the upper bound are of
the same order in terms of database size, which shows that these bounds are asymptotically tight in the
considered regime. We derive these bounds in the following subsections.
Remark. We caution that when the privacy level  also scales, the upper and lower bounds given here
may not meet. For example, let  = n−β for some β > 0 and consider the joint asymptotic regime on
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the 2-dimensional (n, 1 )-plane. In this case, the upper and lower bounds differ by a factor of the order
of n2β .
A. Upper Bound on the Minimax Distortion
In this subsection, we consider a specific -differentially private mechanism E and develop the estima-
tors companioned with it for statistical queries. Since the minimax distortion for statistical queries can
be written as
DS = inf
µM∈U
sup
qϕ∈QS
{
inf
qˆϕ∈Qˆqϕ
sup
x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2]}, (13)
the distortion under the mechanism E and the developed estimators serves as an upper bound on DS ,
which proves the upper bound in Theorem 1. Since we only consider the mechanism E in this subsection,
we drop the subscript Y ∼ µE(x) from expectations for conciseness.
Consider a synthetic database releasing mechanism E with associated mapping µE . For each database
x ∈ Dn, since the output E(x) has a discrete alphabet Dn, we use the pmf pE(x) to represent the
distribution measure µE(x). Then let the mechanism E be specified by
pE(x)(y) =
e−d(x,y)(
1 + (2l − 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (14)
where  ∈ R+ and d is the Hamming distance on Dn. By the form of pE(x), this mechanism can be cast
as an instance of the exponential mechanism with score function −d [20].
Let Y denote E(x) for conciseness when it is clear from the context that x is the underlying database.
Then the pmf pE(x) can be written as
pY (y) =
n∏
i=1
e−δ(xi,yi)
1 + (2l − 1)e− , y ∈ D
n, (15)
where δ(xi, yi) = 0 if xi = yi and δ(xi, yi) = 1 otherwise. Let Yi denote the ith row of Y . Due to the
product form above, the entries {Yi, i ∈ [n]} are independent and each entry Yi has the following pmf
pYi(yi) =
e−δ(xi,yi)
1 + (2l − 1)e− , yi ∈ D. (16)
Therefore this mechanism can also be viewed as a randomized response scheme, where each individual’s
data is perturbed independently and then the perturbed data is released. Note that the mechanism E can
be implemented distributedly due to the independence.
The differential privacy property of the mechanism E is given in the following lemma. The proof is
standard and thus we omit it here due to space limit.
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Lemma 1. The mechanism E is -differentially private.
Next we present the estimators companioned with the mechanism E for the class of statistical queries.
Let g() = 1 + (2l − 1)e−. For each qϕ ∈ QS, consider the estimator qˆuϕ : Dn → R defined by
qˆuϕ(y) =
g()
1− e− qϕ(y)−
e−
1− e−Cϕ, (17)
where
Cϕ =
1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
∑
v∈D
ϕi(v). (18)
Lemma 2. Under the mechanism E , the estimator qˆuϕ is unbiased, i.e., for any database x ∈ Dn,
E[qˆuϕ(Y )] = q(x), (19)
and the distortion of qˆuϕ satisfies the following upper bound:
sup
x∈Dn
E
[|qˆuϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2] ≤ (b− a)2(1 + (2l − 1)e−)2c2(1− e−)2 1n, (20)
where a, b, c are the constants in Definition 3.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. The intuition is that the mechanism E perturbs each
row of the underlying database independently, which encodes an independence structure into the released
synthetic base, and then the estimator qˆuϕ exploits this structure. By the law of large numbers (LLN), the
aggregate perturbation converges to the expectation, which is a constant determined by the query and
thus can be removed in the estimator.
Next we present a proper estimator designed based on qˆuϕ. The answer given by the estimator qˆ
u
ϕ may
not always be consistent with an actual database, in which case qˆuϕ /∈ Qˆqϕ . Thus we consider the estimator
qˆϕ : Dn → R defined by
qˆϕ(y) ∈ arg min
r∈qϕ(Dn)
|qˆuϕ(y)− r|, (21)
which quantizes the answer given by qˆuϕ to the closest value in qϕ(Dn). This quantization guarantees that
qˆϕ is a proper estimator, and degrades the performance guarantee only by a factor of 4 as shown in the
following lemma, the proof of which is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 3. Under the mechanism E , the distortion of the estimator qˆϕ satisfies the following upper bound:
sup
x∈Dn
E
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2] ≤ 4(b− a)2(1 + (2l − 1)e−)2
c2(1− e−)2
1
n
, (22)
where a, b, c are the constants in Definition 3.
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Consider the asymptotic regime that the database size n goes to infinity for given data universe
dimension l and privacy level . By the upper bounds (20) and (22), the estimators qˆuϕ and qˆϕ answer all
the statistical queries with distortion O(1/n) based on the synthetic database released by the mechanism
E . Therefore all the statistical queries can be answered with reasonable accuracy guarantee in large
databases.
Compared with existing approaches, the synthetic database releasing mechanism E does not require a
priori knowledge of the queries of interest, and instead of answering query qϕ by qϕ(Y ), the estimators
qˆuϕ and qˆϕ make more use of the stochastic structure in Y encoded by the mechanism E .
Remark. Under the absolute-error distortion defined by ρ(s, t) = |s− t|, for any s, t ∈ R, the distortion
upper bounds for the estimators qˆuϕ and qˆϕ become
sup
x∈Dn
E
[|qˆuϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|] ≤ (b− a)(1 + (2l − 1)e−)c(1− e−) 1√n
sup
x∈Dn
E
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|] ≤ 2(b− a)(1 + (2l − 1)e−)
c(1− e−)
1√
n
since by Jensen’s inequality
(
E
[|X|])2 ≤ E[|X|2] for any random variable X .
Remark. By the form of the estimator qˆuϕ in (17), the value Cϕ =
1∑n
i=1 ci
∑n
i=1
∑
v∈D ϕi(v) is needed
to answer the query qϕ. In many cases, this value can be easily obtained rather than exhaustive calculation.
In such case, the computation in qˆuϕ is very efficient. Take the following predicate query for an example.
Recall that any v ∈ D = {0, 1}l is a binary vector v = (v1, . . . , vl) of length l. Consider the predicate
function s(v) = vj1 · vj2 · . . . vjk for some {j1, . . . , jk} with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, which counts the fraction of rows
in the database that have value 1 for attributes j1, . . . , jk. This predicate query is a statistical query qϕ
with ϕi = s for any i ∈ [n]. The value Cϕ for this query is Cϕ = 2l−k, which can be obtained by simple
analysis.
Remark. The estimator qˆuϕ is more computationally efficient than the estimator qˆϕ since it does not need
to find the value closest to qˆuϕ(Y ) in qϕ(Dn). Therefore when we are not constricted to the estimators in
Qˆqϕ , it is more desirable to use the estimator qˆuϕ from an implementation perspective.
B. Lower Bound on the Minimax Distortion
Consider any -differentially private mechanism M. For any query qϕ ∈ QS, the form of the optimal
estimator depends on qϕ. Therefore with slight abuse of notation, we denote the optimal estimator by
the function qˆ∗ : Dn×QS → R and the answer by qˆ∗(Y, qϕ), where Y is the synthetic database released
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by the mechanism M. Then our goal is to derive a lower bound on the following worst-case distortion:
sup
qϕ∈QS,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗(Y, qϕ)− qϕ(x)|2]. (23)
Consider such a type of queries, each of which is specified by an element z ∈ Dn and defined by
qz(x) =
1
n
d(x, z), x ∈ Dn,
where d is the Hamming distance on Dn. For any v, v′ ∈ D, let δ(v, v′) = 0 if v = v′ and δ(v, v′) = 1
otherwise. Then the query qz can be written as
qz(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(xi, zi),
from which we can see that the query qz is a statistical query. Let
QZ =
{
qz : Dn → R
∣∣∣∣ qz(x) = 1nd(x, z), z ∈ Dn
}
. (24)
Then QZ ⊆ QS, and therefore
sup
qϕ∈QS,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗(Y, qϕ)− qϕ(x)|2]
≥ sup
qz∈QZ,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗(Y, qz)− qz(x)|2].
To derive a lower bound on the above supremum, consider Dn-valued random variables X,Y, Z with
the following distributions. The random variable X follows a uniform distribution, i.e., the probability
mass function (pmf) pX(x) = 12nl for any x ∈ Dn. Given X = x, the conditional pmf of Y is specified by
the distribution measure µM(x), i.e., pY |X(y | x) = P{M(x) = y} for any y ∈ Dn. The random variable
Z is independent of X and Y , and it also follows a uniform distribution, i.e., the pmf pZ(z) = 12nl for
any z ∈ Dn.
Consider the query qZ , which is the query in QZ specified by Z. Then qZ is a query chosen from QZ
uniformly at random. Due to the independence between Z and (X,Y ), given any X = x and Z = z,
the conditional pmf pY |X,Z(y | x, z) = pY |X(y | x), which corresponds to µM(x). Therefore
sup
qz∈QZ,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗(Y, qz)− qz(x)|2]
= sup
qz∈QZ,x∈Dn
E
[|qˆ∗(Y, qZ)− qZ(X)|2 ∣∣ X = x, Z = z]
≥
∑
z∈Dn,x∈Dn
E
[|qˆ∗(Y, qZ)− qZ(X)|2 ∣∣ X = x, Z = z]pX(x)pZ(z)
= E
[|qˆ∗(Y, qZ)− qZ(X)|2].
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Note that we construct the random variables X and Z only for the proof. Our result in Theorem 1 does
not assume any stochastic model for the database or the query. Note that qˆ∗(Y, qZ) is a function of Y
and Z. Since the conditional expectation is precisely the minimum mean square estimator [21], we have
E
[|qˆ∗(Y, qZ)− qZ(X)|2]
≥ E[|E[qZ(X) | Y, Z]− qZ(X)|2] (25)
=
1
n2
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)|2]. (26)
Recall that the conditional pmf pY |X(· | x) is specified by the distribution measure µM(x). Then since
the mechanism M is -differentially private, for any neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pY |X(y | x) ≤ epY |X(y | x′).
This inequality is needed in the proof of the following lemma, which gives a lower bound on the
expectation in (26).
Lemma 4. There exists a constant C such that
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)|2]
≥ 1
4
((
1− Φ(1))σγ 32√n− Cργ
σ3
)2
,
(27)
where Φ is the cdf of the standard Gaussian distribution,
γ =
1
2
(
1 + e

2l−1
) , σ2 = 1
2l−1
, ρ =
1
2l−1
. (28)
The proof is presented in Appendix C. By this lemma, for any -differentially private mechanism M,
the distortion is lower bounded as
sup
qϕ∈QS,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗(Y, qϕ)− qϕ(x)|2]
≥
(
1− Φ(1))2
2l+4
(
1 + e

2l−1
)3 1n + o
(
1
n
)
,
(29)
which further implies the lower bound in Theorem 1.
V. GENERALIZATION
In this section, we consider a generalization on the discrete database model and analyze the corre-
sponding minimax distortion.
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A. Continuous Data Universe
Consider databases with data universe D being an interval in the l dimensional real coordinate space
Rl. We assume that l is a constant, so we present the case that l = 1 and D = [0, 1] for clarity. Consider
the class of statistical queries with L-Lipschitz row functions, i.e., the query class
QSL = {qϕ ∈ QS | |ϕi(u)− ϕi(v)| ≤ L|u− v|, for any u, v ∈ [0, 1] and any i = 1, 2, . . . }. (30)
Then the minimax distortion can be written as
DS,L = inf
µM∈U
sup
qϕ∈QSL,x∈Dn
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗ϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2].
We note that the lower bound in Theorem 1 still holds for continuous data universe since {0, 1}n ⊆
[0, 1]n. To obtain an upper bound, we consider the following approach for a database x ∈ [0, 1]n: first
each row of x is discretized into k bits; then the mechanism E and the companion estimator qˆϕ are used
for the discretized database. Denote the discretized database by xˆ. Then xˆ ∈ {0, 12k , . . . , 2
k−1
2k }n. By the
discretization precision, |xi − xˆi| ≤ 12k for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Thus for any qϕ ∈ QSL,
|qϕ(x)− qϕ(xˆ)| ≤ 1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
|ϕi(xi)− ϕi(xˆi)| ≤ L
c2k
.
By Lemma 3,
E
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(xˆ)|] ≤ 2(b− a)(1 + (2k − 1)e−)
c(1− e−)
1√
n
,
where we omit the subscript Y ∼ pE(x) of the expectation for conciseness. Then
E
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2]
≤ E[(|qϕ(x)− qϕ(xˆ)|+ |qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(xˆ)|)2]
≤ |qϕ(x)− qϕ(xˆ)|2 + |qϕ(x)− qϕ(xˆ)| · E[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(xˆ)|]
+ (E[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(xˆ)|])2
≤ L
2
c222k
+
2(b− a)(1 + (2k − 1)e−)L
c2(1− e−)2k
1√
n
+
4(b− a)2(1 + (2k − 1)e−)2
c2(1− e−)2
1
n
.
Let 22k =
√
n. We obtain
E
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2] ≤ (L2
c2
+
4(b− a)2e−2
c2(1− e−)2
)
1√
n
+ o
(
1√
n
)
,
which gives an upper bound on DS,L.
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Proposition 1. With continuous data universe D = [0, 1], the minimax distortion for statistical queries
with L-Lipschitz row functions satisfies the following bounds:(
1− Φ(1))2
25(1 + e)3
1
n
+ o
(
1
n
)
≤ DS,L ≤
(
L2
c2
+
4(b− a)2e−2
c2(1− e−)2
)
1√
n
+ o
(
1√
n
)
. (31)
Remark. For a continuous data universe, the optimal estimator qˆ∗ϕ may not be attainable. In this case,
we need to express the minimax distortion DS,L in the same form as (13). However, this does not change
the arguments for the lower and upper bounds.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND APPLICATION
In this section, we first evaluate the mechanism E in (14) when companioned with the estimator qˆuϕ
in (17) through experiments on a Netflix dataset [22] for statistical queries. During the experiments, we
compare our approach with the MWEM algorithm (a combination of the Exponential Mechanism with
the Multiplicative Weights update rules) [9]. The main conclusion from the experimental results is that
the proposed approach provides reasonable accuracy for all the tested queries, irrespective of the form of
the queries or the number of the tested queries, which improves over the MWEM algorithm. The scaling
behavior O(1/n) of the minimax distortion as the database size n goes to infinity is also verified by the
experimental results.
We next consider the application of differentially private cut function release for graphs and derive an
upper bound on the minimax distortion for this application. We evaluate our approach through experiments
on a Facebook dataset [23]. The experimental results verify the theoretical upper bound and show that
the proposed approach works well for this application.
A. Evaluation for Statistical Queries
In this subsection, we conduct experiments on the Netflix dataset for statistical queries. The Netflix
dataset consists of movie ratings from users, with each rating on a scale from 1 to 5 (integral) stars. We
treat each rating as a row and model the dataset as a database. To obtain databases with different sizes,
we take subsets from the dataset.
The experimental evaluation in this subsection has three focuses: (1) the separation between statistical
queries and linear queries, (2) distortion under varying query set size, and (3) scaling behavior of the
distortion under varying database size.
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1) Statistical Queries vs. Linear Queries: The class of statistical queries is much larger than the class
of linear queries since a statistical query allows different row functions, whereas a linear query can only
have identical row functions. For the private movie rating release application, it is possible to encounter
queries that perform different functions on different rows, since different movies or users may belong to
different groups and have different weights in a query. We call the number of distinct row functions in
a statistical query the heterogeneity of the query. Consider a statistical query qϕ and the associated row
function sequence ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn). If the heterogeneity of qϕ equals to 1, then ϕ1 = · · · = ϕn, and
thus qϕ is a linear query. If the heterogeneity of qϕ is greater than 1, then not all the ϕi’s are equal.
For example, during the experiments in this subsection, when the heterogeneity equal to 2, the statistical
query performs one row function for the first half of the rows, and performs another row function for
the second half.
The mechanism E and the companion estimator qˆuϕ is designed for statistical queries. The upper bound
(20) on the distortion of the proposed approach holds for any statistical query, and thus holds for any
heterogeneity. The MWEM algorithm is designed for linear queries. To evaluate the MWEM algorithm
for statistical queries, we adapt it as follows. For each distinct row function in a statistical query, we treat
the set of rows associated with this row function as a “sub-database”. Restricted to this sub-database, the
statistical query is a linear query, so we can run the MWEM algorithm on the sub-database to generate
a synthetic sub-database. Then the answer to the statistical query is obtained by combining the answers
at each sub-database. When there are multiple statistical queries in the query set, we need to divide the
database into sub-databases such that restricted to a sub-database, any query in the query set is a linear
query. In the experiment, we consider statistical queries with same row functions for ratings of the same
movie.
We evaluate the proposed approach and the MWEM algorithm on a database of size n = 162, 567
from the Netflix dataset, consisting of ratings for 128 movies. Each movie has roughly 1000 ∼ 2000
ratings. Statistical queries are generated randomly in the following way. To specify a row function ϕi, the
values ϕ(1), ϕ(2), . . . , ϕ(5) are sufficient. We generate i.i.d. random variables X1, . . . , X5 with uniform
distribution on [0, 1], and divide them by maxiXi − miniXi for normalization. Then these values are
used to specify a row function. For a statistical query with heterogeneity h, we generate h row functions
independently, and assign each row function to rows corresponding to 1/h of the movies. During the
experiments, we consider heterogeneity varying from 1 to 128. For each heterogeneity h, we generate
a set of 200 statistical queries with heterogeneity h independently. We use the absolute-error distortion
measure, i.e., ρ(s, t) = |s− t| for any s, t ∈ R, since both our approach and the MWEM algorithm have
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Fig. 2: Distortion under varying heterogeneity. The proposed approach is robust to heterogeneity, whereas
the distortion of the MWEM algorithm grows as the heterogeneity increases.
distortion upper bound under this distortion measure. We measure the worst-case distortion among the
queries in the query set, and then take an average over 20 independent runs. The differential privacy level
is fixed to  = 1.
Figure 2 compares our approach against the MWEM algorithm with varying heterogeneity. The figure
shows that the proposed approach gives similar distortions irrespective of the heterogeneity, whereas under
the MWEM algorithm, the distortion grows as the heterogeneity increases. This experimental result shows
a separation between statistical queries and linear queries: approaches designed for linear queries cannot
be directly applied to statistical queries without performance loss.
2) Query Set Size–Independent Distortion: Under most existing mechanisms [4], [5], [9]–[11] for
synthetic database release, the accuracy guarantee becomes worse as the query set size increases. Under
the MWEM algorithm, the worst-case distortion among the queries in a query set is O((log(|Q|))1/3),
where |Q| is the query set size. Our approach does not restrict to a specific query set. The distortion
upper bound in (20) holds for all the statistical queries. Therefore, under our approach, the worst-case
distortion among the queries in a query set will not grow as the query set size increases.
We evaluate the proposed approach and the MWEM algorithm on databases from the Netflix dataset.
We randomly generate linear query sets with the size varying from 64 to 1, 048, 576, using the same
method as in the previous experiments. We still use the absolute-error distortion measure. We measure
the worst-case distortion among the queries in the query set and among 50 databases, with database sizes
roughly within 1000 ∼ 2000. Then the worst-case distortion is averaged over 20 independent runs. The
differential privacy level is fixed to  = 1.
Figure 3 compares our approach against the MWEM algorithm with varying query set size. The
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Fig. 3: Distortion under varying query set size. The worst-case distortion of the proposed approach does
not depend on the query set size, whereas the distortion of the MWEM algorithm grows (slowly) as the
query set size increases.
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Fig. 4: Distortion under varying database size. In the asymptotic regime that the database size n goes to
infinity, the upper bound is Θ(1/n), so the distortion is O(1/n).
figures shows that the proposed approach gives similar worst-case distortion for different query set sizes.
However, for the MWEM algorithm, although very slowly, the worst-case distortion grows as the query
set size increases. Therefore, to achieve certain accuracy, this growth indicates that the query set size
must be smaller than a threshold. This experimental result verifies the dependence of the distortion on
the query set size under the MWEM algorithm, and shows the advantage of our approach.
3) Scaling Behavior: Consider the asymptotic regime that the database size n goes to infinity for given
data universe dimension and differential privacy level. We have proved that the worst-case squared-error
distortion of the mechanism E when companioned with the estimator qˆuϕ is O(1/n). To verify this
theoretical upper bound, we evaluate the proposed approach on databases from the Netflix dataset. The
sizes of the databases vary from 14, 559 to 232, 944. A linear query set of size 200 is randomly generated
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in the same way as the previous experiments and used for all the databases. We use the squared-error
distortion measure, i.e., ρ(s, t) = (s− t)2 for any s, t ∈ R. We measure the worst-case distortion among
the queries in the query set, and then take an average over 20 independent runs. The differential privacy
level is fixed to  = 1. Figure 4 compares the distortion under the proposed approach with the upper
bound in (20), which verifies the asymptotic order O(1/n) of the distortion.
B. Differentially Private Cut Function Release for Graphs
Consider the scenario that the given database is a graph, where the presence of individual edges is
sensitive information. Such a graph can represent the online social connections between individuals. To
release useful information for graph analysis, a well studied approach is to privately release the cut
function of the graph [10], [24], [25].
Let the graph be G = (V,E) and ℘(V ) denote the power set of V . Then the cut function fG : ℘(V )×
℘(V )→ [|E|] associated with this graph is defined by
fG(S, T ) = |{(i, j) ∈ E | i ∈ S, j ∈ T}|, (32)
which is the number of edges crossing the S, T -cut for any disjoint S, T ⊆ V .
We use a database x to represent the graph G. Since differential privacy needs to be preserved for
edges, each row of x corresponds to a vertex pair (i, j) ∈ V × V , where xi,j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, and
xi,j = 0 otherwise. Here we use (i, j) to index each row of x. Thus the data universe is {0, 1} with
dimension l = 1 and the database size n = |V |2. Two databases x, x′ are neighbors if there exists exactly
one vertex pair (i, j) such that xi,j 6= x′i,j .
For any disjoint S, T ⊆ V , we write fG(S, T ) as a function qS,T of x and call it a cut query. Consider
the absolute-error distortion measure ρ(s, t) = |s− t| for any s, t ∈ R. Then the minimax distortion for
-differentially private cut function release can be written as
DC = inf
µM∈U
sup
x∈{0,1}n
S,T⊆V,S∩T=∅
EY∼µM(x)
[|qˆ∗S,T (Y )− qS,T (x)|].
Consider the statistical query defined in Definition 3. Then a cut query qS,T can be viewed as an
unnormalized statistical query over the subset S × T ⊆ V × V of all the rows. The row function is
ϕi,j(xi,j) = xi,j since
qS,T (x) =
∑
(i,j)∈S×T
xi,j . (33)
Consider the mechanism E and estimator qˆS,T : {0, 1}n → R defined by
qˆS,T (y) =
1 + e−
1− e− qS,T (y)−
e−
1− e− |S||T |, (34)
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|V | 577 1154 1731 2308 2885 3462 4039
Error 10.4% 11.7% 8.7% 5.3% 4.7% 5.3% 5.4%
TABLE I: Relative error for cut queries.
which is an adapted version of the estimator qˆuϕ defined in (17) for the query qS,T . Let Y denote the
released synthetic database E(x). By similar analysis as in the proof of Lemma 2, the distortion is
bounded as
EY∼µE(x)
[|qˆS,T (Y )− qS,T (x)|] ≤ 1 + e−
1− e−
√
|S||T |. (35)
For any S, T ⊆ V , |S||T | ≤ |V |2. Therefore the minimax distortion is upper bounded as
DC ≤
1 + e−
1− e− |V |. (36)
1) Evaluation on the Facebook Dataset: We evaluate the proposed approach on databases from the
Facebook dataset for the application of cut query release. The Facebook dataset is a graph. Each vertex
in the graph represents a user, and an edge between two vertices indicates that they are friends.
Consider the asymptotic regime that the number of vertices |V | goes to infinity. We have proved that
the absolute-error distortion for any cut query is O(|V |). To verify this theoretical upper bound, we
apply our approach on subgraphs of the graph given by the Facebook dataset. The graph consists of
4039 vertices and 88, 234 edges. The number of vertices in the considered subgraphs vary from 577 to
4039. For each subgraph, cut queries are generated randomly in the following way. Half of the vertices
are uniformly sampled and this vertex set is denoted by S. Then S and V − S specify a cut query. This
choice of cut queries results in the largest upper bound on the distortion as shown in (35). We generate
a cut query set consisting of 100 cut queries independently. We measure the worst-case absolute-error
distortion among the cut queries in the query set, and then take an average over 10 independent runs.
The differential privacy level is fixed to  = 1. Figure 5 compares the distortion under the proposed
approach with the upper bound in (35), which verifies the asymptotic order O(|V |) of the distortion. The
worst-case relative distortion in Table I shows that the accuracy is reasonable for cut queries.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed a minimax approach for differentially private query release, where query-set
independent differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanisms are devised and the companion
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Fig. 5: Distortion of cut queries under varying number of nodes in the graph. In the asymptotic regime
that the number of nodes |V | goes to infinity, the upper bound is Θ(|V |), so the distortion is O(|V |).
estimators are designed to provide accurate answers for all queries in a general query class. For the
general class of statistical queries, we proved that with the squared-error distortion measure, the minimax
distortion DS is O(1/n) by deriving asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds in the regime that
the database size n goes to infinity. The upper bound was achieved by a differentially private synthetic
database releasing mechanism E and the companion estimators, which indicates that it is feasible to
use query-set independent differentially private synthetic database releasing mechanisms while providing
accurate answers for all the statistical queries in large databases.
In this work, we have focused on the minimax distortion in the asymptotic regime that database size
n grows. It is also of great interest to quantify the scaling laws of the minimax distortion in the joint
asymptotic regime in terms of database size n, data universe dimension l and the differential privacy
level . We are currently investigating this issue and aim at designing better differentially private synthetic
database releasing mechanisms for large data universe dimension l and finding tighter lower bounds in
terms of .
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. We drop the subscript Y ∼ µE(x) from expectations for conciseness during the proof. We first
prove that the estimator qˆuϕ is unbiased. Recall that {Yi, i ∈ [n]} follow the pmfs in (16). Then
E[qϕ(Y )] =
1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
E[ϕi(Yi)]
=
1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
(
1
g()
ϕi(xi) +
e−
g()
∑
v∈D :
v 6=xi
ϕi(v)
)
=
1− e−
g()
1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
ϕi(xi)
+
e−
g()
1∑n
i=1 ci
n∑
i=1
∑
v∈D
ϕi(v)
=
1− e−
g()
qϕ(x) +
e−
g()
Cϕ.
Therefore
E[qˆuϕ(Y )] = E
[
g()
1− e− qϕ(Y )−
e−
1− e−Cϕ
]
= qϕ(x).
Next we prove the upper bound on the distortion of qˆuϕ. For any x ∈ Dn,
qˆuϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)
=
g()
1− e−
1∑n
i=1 ci
·
n∑
i=1
(
ϕi(Yi)− 1− e
−
g()
ϕi(xi)− e
−
g()
∑
v∈D
ϕi(v)
)
.
For any i ∈ [n], let
Zi = ϕi(Yi)− 1− e
−
g()
ϕi(xi)− e
−
g()
∑
v∈D
ϕi(v).
Then for any i ∈ [n], E[Zi] = 0. Recall that for any v ∈ D, a ≤ ϕi(v) ≤ b, so |Zi| ≤ b − a. Since
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Y1, . . . , Yn are independent, Z1, . . . , Zn are independent. Let Z = 1n
∑n
i=1 Zi. Then
E
[|qˆuϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2]
=
(
g()
1− e−
n∑n
i=1 ci
)2
· E[∣∣Z∣∣2]
=
(
g()
1− e−
n∑n
i=1 ci
)2
·
(
1
n2
n∑
i=1
E
[|Zi|2])
≤
(
g()
1− e−
)2 1
c2
(b− a)2
n
.
Therefore
sup
x∈Dn
E
[|qˆuϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2] ≤ (b− a)2(1 + (2l − 1)e−)2c2(1− e−)2 1n.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. For any x, y ∈ Dn, since qϕ(x) ∈ qϕ(Dn), by the definition of the estimator qˆϕ in (21),
|qˆuϕ(y)− qˆϕ(y)| ≤ |qˆuϕ(y)− qϕ(x)|.
Therefore
|qˆϕ(y)− qϕ(x)| ≤ |qˆϕ(y)− qˆuϕ(y)|+ |qˆuϕ(y)− qϕ(x)|
≤ 2|qˆuϕ(y)− qϕ(x)|,
and
E
[|qˆϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2] ≤ 4E[|qˆuϕ(Y )− qϕ(x)|2].
Then combining with (20) yields the upper bound.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality,
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y, Z]− d(X,Z)|2]
≥ (E[|E[d(X,Z) | Y, Z]− d(X,Z)|])2. (37)
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Let X˜ be a random variable satisfying the following conditions: X˜ is independent of Z; X˜ is independent
of X given Y ; given Y , X˜ and X are identically distributed, i.e., pX˜|Y (x | y) = pX|Y (x | y) for
any x, y ∈ Dn with pY (y) 6= 0. Due to the independence between Z and (X,Y, X˜), we also have
pX˜|Y,Z(x | y, z) = pX|Y,Z(x | y, z) for any x, y, z ∈ Dn with pY (y) 6= 0. By this construction, for any
y, z ∈ Dn with pY (y) 6= 0,
E[d(X,Z) | Y = y, Z = z] = E[d(X˜, Z) | Y = y, Z = z],
and
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)| ∣∣ Y = y, Z = z]
= E
[|E[d(X˜, Z) | Y,Z]− d(X˜, Z)| ∣∣ Y = y, Z = z],
which further lead to
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)|]
= E
[
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)| ∣∣ Y,Z]]
= E
[
E
[|E[d(X˜, Z) | Y,Z]− d(X˜, Z)| ∣∣ Y,Z]]
= E
[|E[d(X˜, Z) | Y,Z]− d(X˜, Z)|].
Therefore
2E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)|]
= E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y, Z]− d(X,Z)|
+ |E[d(X˜, Z) | Y,Z]− d(X˜, Z)|]
≥ E[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)
+ E[d(X˜, Z) | Y,Z]− E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]|]
= E
[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)|].
Combing this with (37) gives
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y,Z]− d(X,Z)|2]
≥ 1
4
(
E
[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)|])2. (38)
Then it suffices to derive a lower bound on E
[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)|].
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Notice that the conditional pmf pX˜|X is -differentially private since for any neighboring x, x
′ ∈ Dn
and any x˜ ∈ Dn,
pX˜|X(x˜ | x) =
∑
y∈Dn
pX˜|Y,X(x˜ | y, x)pY |X(y | x) (39)
=
∑
y∈Dn
pX˜|Y,X(x˜ | y, x′)pY |X(y | x) (40)
≤
∑
y∈Dn
pX˜|Y,X(x˜ | y, x′) · epY |X(y | x′) (41)
= epX˜|X(x˜ | x′), (42)
where (40) follows from the conditional independence between X˜ and X given Y , and (41) holds because
pY |X is -differentially private. Then by Theorem 1 in [26] (for our case, the X in that theorem is 0),
E[d(X, X˜)] ≥ n
1 + e

2l−1
.
Let γ = 1
2(1+ e

2l−1 )
and s = γn. Since
E[d(X, X˜)] ≤ sP{d(X, X˜) < s}+ nP{d(X, X˜) ≥ s}
≤ s+ nP{d(X, X˜) ≥ s},
we have
P{d(X, X˜) ≥ s} ≥ 1
n
(E[d(X, X˜)]− s)
≥ 1
n
(
n
1 + e

2l−1
− n
2
(
1 + e

2l−1
))
= γ,
i.e.,
P{d(X, X˜) ≥ γn} ≥ γ. (43)
We will consider those x, x˜ ∈ Dn with d(x, x˜) ≥ γn to obtain a lower bound on E[|d(X,Z)−d(X˜, Z)|].
Utilizing conditional expectation gives
E[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)|]
= E
[
E[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)| | X, X˜]]
≥
∑
x,x˜:
d(x,x˜)≥γn
E[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)| | X = x, X˜ = x˜]pX,X˜(x, x˜). (44)
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Consider any x, x˜ ∈ Dn with d(x, x˜) ≥ γn and pX,X˜(x, x˜) 6= 0. Since Z is independent of (X, X˜),
E[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)| | X = x, X˜ = x˜]
= E[|d(x, Z)− d(x˜, Z)|]. (45)
Let
∆(x, x˜) = {i ∈ [n] | xi 6= x˜i}. (46)
Then |∆(x, x˜)| ≥ γn, and
|d(x, Z)− d(x˜, Z)| =
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
(
ζ(xi, Zi)− ζ(x˜i, Zi)
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈∆(x,x˜)
(
ζ(xi, Zi)− ζ(x˜i, Zi)
)∣∣∣∣.
Let
Ui = ζ(xi, Zi)− ζ(x˜i, Zi). (47)
Since Z is uniformly distributed over Dn, the rows Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn are i.i.d. with pmf pZi(zi) = 12l for
any zi ∈ D. For any i ∈ ∆(x, x˜),
Ui =

1 if Zi = x˜i,
−1 if Zi = xi,
0 otherwise.
(48)
Therefore {Ui, i ∈ ∆(x, x˜)} are i.i.d. with pmf
pUi(ui) =

1
2l ui = 1,
1
2l ui = −1,
1− 12l−1 ui = 0.
(49)
Then E[Ui] = 0. Denote
σ2 = E
[|Ui|2] = 1
2l−1
, ρ = E
[|Ui|3] = 1
2l−1
. (50)
By the Berry–Esseen theorem [27, Theorem 7.4.1], there exists a universal constant C such that for any
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t,
P
{
1
σ
√|∆(x, x˜)| ∑
i∈∆(x,x˜)
Ui >
t
σ
√
γ
}
≥ 1− Φ
( t
σ
√
γ
)
− Cρ
σ3
√|∆(x, x˜)|
≥ 1− Φ
( t
σ
√
γ
)
− Cρ
σ3
√
γn
,
where the second inequality follows from |∆(x, x˜)| ≥ γn. Therefore
P
{|d(x, Z)− d(x˜, Z)| > t√n}
= P
{
1
σ
√|∆(x, x˜)| ∑
i∈∆(x,x˜)
Ui >
t
√
n
σ
√|∆(x, x˜)|
}
≥ P
{
1
σ
√|∆(x, x˜)| ∑
i∈∆(x,x˜)
Ui >
t
√
n
σ
√
γn
}
≥ 1− Φ
( t
σ
√
γ
)
− Cρ
σ3
√
γn
.
Let t = σ
√
γ, then
P
{|d(x, Z)− d(x˜, Z)| > σ√γn} ≥ 1− Φ(1)− Cρ
σ3
√
γn
,
and further
E[|d(x, Z)− d(x˜, Z)|]
≥ σ√γn · P{|d(x, Z)− d(x˜, Z)| > σ√γn}
≥ (1− Φ(1))σ√γn− Cρ
σ3
. (51)
Inserting this lower bound back to (45), (44) and combining the lower bound (43) yield
E[|d(X,Z)− d(X˜, Z)|]
≥
∑
x,x˜:
d(x,x˜)≥γn
((
1− Φ(1))σ√γn− Cρ
σ3
)
pX,X˜(x, x˜)
=
((
1− Φ(1))σ√γn− Cρ
σ3
)
P{d(X, X˜) ≥ γn}
≥ (1− Φ(1))σγ 32√n− Cργ
σ3
.
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Therefore, by (38),
E
[|E[d(X,Z) | Y, Z]− d(X,Z)|2]
≥ 1
4
((
1− Φ(1))σγ 32√n− Cργ
σ3
)2
,
which completes the proof.
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